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Michael Peters (MP): Can I jump in the deep-end (with apologies to Fou- 
cault) and ask you to respond to the observation that we are living the end 
of philosophy and the modern research university (at least as it was in- 
augurated by the establishment of the University of Berlin in 1811)? 
 
Sharon Rider (SR): That is a very deep question. To begin with, it has to 
do with the nature of philosophy as a way of life, as a way of thinking that 
is taught by example, whether it be communicated orally or in writing. In 
short, philosophy is a primary example of “the unity of teaching as research” 
that one associates with the name of Humboldt. Now I think that many of us 
in the humanities have been somewhat shaken in our faith concerning the 
value of teaching philosophy at a modern, public university. On the one hand, 
we’d like to think that we’re doing some good by showing students the value 
of trying to think for themselves. Sapere aude and all that. And it seems to 
stand to reason that if you spend a couple of years of your youth hanging 
around with Kant and Wittgenstein, you might just learn something about 
what that can mean, by way of example. In any case, it certainly does no 
harm to teach or study philosophy, and it can clearly do some good. But the 
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heart of the matter is whether or not Socrates was right in thinking that 
someone committed to wanting the right things and living the right way, will 
do all such things better if he tries to justify wanting such and doing such 
things. Bernard Williams puts the question quite nicely in the preface to his 
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy:  
 
How could it be that a subject, something studied in universities 
(but not only there), something for which there is a large tech- 
nical literature, could deliver what one might recognize as an 
answer to the basic questions of life? It is hard to see how this 
could be so, unless, as Socrates believed, the answer were one that 
the reader would recognize as one he might have given himself. 
But how could this be? And how would this be related to the 
existence of the subject? For Socrates, there was no such subject; 
he just talked with his friends in a plain way, and the writers he 
referred to (at least with any respect) were the poets.  
 
Furthermore, as university faculty in the first instance, we have a basic re- 
sponsibility to see to it that our colleges attract and retain students, that the 
students are deemed “employable” according the criteria dictated by govern- 
ing bodies from university boards to the EU, that we produce “research” that 
gets cited in top-ranked journals, that we are successful in grant capture, etc. 
This set of responsibilities, if not inimical to philosophy as Socrates under- 
stood it, is at very least not identical with it. And what do students really 
retain from studying philosophy at college? To judge from the popular dis- 
cussions in papers and magazines, they seem to remember only a few of the 
more colorful aspects of philosophy: that Plato argued that we live in a cave, 
that Descartes thought we might be dreaming everything, that Kant believed 
you should tell Nazis the truth about the Jews hiding in your attic if they 
come to your house looking for them, that Nietzsche thought people were 
only interested in power, etc. Of course, there’s always one or two who take 
away something more, but that’s equally true of mathematics or political 
science. And it’s not easy to predict who will take what. A couple of years 
ago, I gave an introductory lecture on the Enlightenment. I took up the 
French, the English and the Scotts, but the emphasis was on the Germans. 
We took a break after about an hour of Kant. During the break, an Iranian 
girl came up to me with tears in her eyes, and told me that now she can 
begin to understand why the Iranian Revolution turned out as it did. No 
educational quality assessment system in the world, however intricately con- 
trived, can assure or prevent someone from being moved to tears by Kant. 
But it made me feel that what I was doing was valuable. So I suppose that 
the issue is not so much what most students get or don’t get out of studying 
philosophy, as an empirical question as it were. It’s more the sinking feeling 
that philosophy has to a far too great an extent become its forms and in- 
stitutions rather than a way of living and thinking about how one lives, how 
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we live. I tend to think that serious epistemological questions are always at 
the same time existential questions for the one thinking about them. That’s 
the point of calling them “problems.” What I wonder is if these sorts of 
problems can be recognized as real problems that someone can have anymore, 
at least in the west. That one is tempted to retreat into Aurelius’ “inner 
citadel,” Hegel would say, says something about the times in which we live. 
And it seems pretty clear that philosophy and all of the liberal arts are in big 
trouble (much of it self-induced). I’m not saying that there aren’t or will not 
be people of a philosophical bent, for whom philosophical questions are alive 
and pertinent. But my sense is that there are fewer and fewer such people, as 
if our form of life has no time for it. The call of philosophy seems to have 
grown fainter, barely audible for the most part.  
      The modern research university in its original conception is based on an 
idea of science that grew out of a philosophical ideal, one which Husserl 
describes in “The Crisis of the Sciences as Expression of the Radical Life-
Crisis of European Humanity” (Part 1 of The Crisis of European Sciences 
and Transcendental Phenomenology):  
 
A definite ideal of a universal philosophy and its method forms 
the beginning; this is, so to speak, the primal establishment of 
the philosophical modern age and all its lines of development. 
But instead of being able to work itself out in fact, this ideal 
suffers an inner dissolution. As against attempts to carry out and 
newly fortify the ideal, this dissolution gives rise to revolutionary, 
more or less radical innovations. Thus the problem of the ge- 
nuine ideal of universal philosophy and its genuine method now 
actually becomes the innermost driving force of all historical 
philosophical movements. But this is to say that, ultimately, all 
modern sciences drifted into a peculiar, increasingly puzzling 
crisis with regard to the meaning of their original founding as 
branches of philosophy, a meaning which they continued to bear 
within themselves. This is a crisis which does not encroach upon 
the theoretical and practical successes of the special sciences; 
yet it shakes to the foundations the whole meaning of their truth. 
This is not just a matter of a special form of culture – ‘science’ 
or ‘philosophy’ – as one among others belonging to European 
mankind. For the primal establishment of the new philosophy is, 
according to what was said earlier, the primal establishment of 
modern European humanity itself – humanity which seeks to re- 
new itself radically, as against the foregoing medieval and ancient 
age, precisely and only through its new philosophy. Thus the 
crisis of philosophy implies the crisis of all modern sciences as 
members of the philosophical universe: at first a latent, then a 
more and more prominent crisis of European humanity itself in 
respect to the total meaningfulness of its cultural life, its total 
‘Existenz.’ 
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The entirety of Husserl’s lifework can be described as an attempt to re-
establish philosophy in the ancient sense at the heart of science and culture.  
Despite his emphasis on the new philosophy as Europe’s attempt to radically 
renew itself, in point of fact, he doesn’t fully draw out the consequences of 
the break with antiquity, in particular with Greek mathematics. He seeks 
continuity between modern mathematics and ancient Greek philosophy, where 
there was in fact a radical rupture, since algebra, which was so crucial to the 
birth of modern science, is fundamentally Arabic-Hindu. By taking Galileo 
as his paradigmatic example of modern science, he has already assumed the 
primacy of Euclidean geometry and an ancient Greek ontology. I take Hus- 
serl as my example, because his was the last great attempt at a systematic 
philosophy that would elucidate the meaning of modern science and modern 
life, whatever one thinks of such a project. The idea of the modern univer- 
sity can be understood as the incarnation of a similar ideal of cultural and 
scientific self-renewal deeply rooted in a philosophical idea of human reason 
and its cultivation. Now every ideal says something about what we value and 
what kind of world and what sort of society we are prepared to build and 
inhabit, and thus also what we want to change. If one looks at the criteria by 
which universities and their institutions are assessed, one can’t help but notice 
the complete and total absence of anything resembling the Humboldtian ideal 
(even the obligatory gestures toward “critical thinking” and “self-realization” 
are strikingly empty, as if the authors of the policy documents in question 
actually have no idea what these terms can mean except in some superficial 
therapeutic, commercial or political sense). So yes, I do think that the demise 
of philosophy and the deterioration of the university that we are seeing today 
are intimately linked. But that doesn’t mean that philosophy or philosophers 
can do much about it. As Hegel says in the preface to the Philosophy of 
Right, regarding the philosopher’s desire to “give instruction to what the 
world ought to be:” “Philosophy in any case always comes on the scene too 
late to give it. When philosophy paints its gloomy picture then a form of life 
has grown old. It cannot be rejuvenated by the gloomy picture, but only 
understood. Only when the dusk starts to fall does the owl of Minerva 
spread its wings and fly.” It seems to me that the best way to understand 
Humboldt’s idea is as pointing out that the old university had become a 
relic. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, Humboldt saw the need to 
reform the university, not only administratively, but in its very conception. 
His reforms were intended to make the university something of use to the 
present. But I would say that the forward-looking reforms were something 
that Humboldt proposed as a man of action, not as a philosopher.  
 
MP: Does this mean in a Rortyean sense we are living in a post-philo- 
sophical culture? Is there a form of the post-philosophical that can take the 
place Kantian philosophy once occupied? How real are these apocalyptic 
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tropes? Are they rhetorical flourishes or a deep source of cultural or institu- 
tional renewal? 
 
SR: I was at first surprised by this question, since I hadn’t actually intended 
my response to strike an apocalyptic tone, or even a nostalgic one. I think 
that we have to distinguish between an institutional crisis and an intellectual 
or spiritual one. They’re intimately connected, of course, which was one of 
the things I tried to describe in my last answer, viz. that philosophy as a 
spiritual activity can’t survive in a vacuum. Actually, I would think that phi- 
losophy as an institution – its organization and activities – will likely look 
pretty much the same in fifty years. True, it will disappear from colleges and 
universities whose governing bodies are inclined to invest in “employability,” 
i.e. professional degree programs that attract and retain students. But in small 
liberal arts colleges that serve the elites as well as in major research insti- 
tutions, philosophy will continue to carry on and muddle through, although 
at public institutions presumably in more commercially viable forms: they’ll 
offer courses in “decision theory and risk-analysis,” value theory, theories 
of science, “critical thinking and argument,” as well as a host of ethics 
courses preceded by a word or prefix ensuring societal relevance (“business 
ethics,” “biomedical ethics,” “engineering ethics,” etc). At the most elite 
private universities, part of the cachet will be that the kind of high culture 
that is associated with studies in Latin and Shakespeare and Kant can be 
offered and obtained. Students at places like Harvard and Yale will go on to 
med school and law school or prestigious MBA-programs, and a background 
in the liberal arts will not only look good on their resumés, but might very 
serve them well in their lives and even in the exercise of their professions 
(Someone engaged in high-level politics or administration who has studied 
Macchiavelli in depth, for example, has an advantage over someone who 
hasn’t). But for the rest of the population, philosophy has the status of 
arcane academic ritual; it’s not something that you pay good money for if 
you don’t have lots of it. If you have such inclinations, you listen to Michael 
Sandel’s MOOC lectures for free on the weekend, after a long week of 
“real” studies.  I imagine that “research” in philosophy will also continue to be 
funded, although increasingly in collaboration with more practical disciplines: 
philosophers will work together with psychologists in cognitive science proj- 
ects, say, on group decision-making; or they’ll join forces with economists 
to work out models for prioritizing in health care; even urban planners can 
make use of certain kinds of logical formalization in transportation logistics, 
etc. 
Now this development, it seems to me, is not a radical break. It has been 
going on for at least a hundred years, and can be seen as a natural, almost 
inevitable, consequence of the developments that fall under the term “mod- 
ernity.” Modern, rationalist thought since Descartes has led, among other 
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things, to the replacement of religious thinking with scientific thinking, which 
in turn has been replaced with “research,” and now, with “innovation.” But 
“research,” by which I mean specialization, i.e. a goal-directed, planned, 
collective activity for investigation and control, is an extremely modern idea. 
An even more modern idea is the idea of science as innovation, that is, an 
activity the purpose of which is direct utility, in particular economic utility, 
through the commercialization and dissemination of new findings and ap- 
plications. Given this development, it is also natural that the cultivation of a 
broad, enhanced capacity to make use of one’s own understanding and thus 
to become more capable of sound, independent judgment, will have to cede 
its place at the university to training in specific methods and procedures for 
achieving concrete results and skills, which, in turn, will be rationalized into 
an efficient mechanism for imparting and instilling in the workforce what- 
ever competencies and skills are needed at the time by industry and com- 
merce. And this development encompasses all subjects taught at universities, 
including the discipline called philosophy.   
What I want to say is that there is another idea of philosophy than “train- 
ing in critical thinking” as understood by the industrial-educational complex.  
And this idea has always been somewhat regarded as somehow suspect and 
subversive, enigmatic, even ridiculous. But due to the “inefficiency” of the 
university as a machine for processing and delivering “intended outcomes,” 
as it’s so eloquently described in the higher education literature, it was per- 
mitted to exist. As an idea, it’s difficult to describe without sounding preten- 
tious or mystical, especially since the idea has taken such different forms 
since Plato. But formulations such as “philosophy as a way of life” (vita 
contemplativa), philosophy as “work on oneself,” philosophy as “the search 
for truth,” etc. are expressions of the idea that I’m talking about. And what I 
want to say is that this idea has been decisive for all so-called “progress” in 
western thinking, especially scientific thinking. It’s an idea of philosophy that 
is not identical with the discipline and its institutions, but rather has very 
often been at odds with it. It’s rather an attitude or a stance where a certain 
kind of uncompromising demand for intellectual satisfaction creates friction 
when confronted with demands for utility or general acceptance. And this 
stance, this logical and moral requirement which the individual places on 
himself, is at least as much a part of philosophical Bildung as the various 
theories, concepts, standard problems and alternative solutions that make up 
the “stuff” of philosophy, and is ideally its final result as well. Philosophy in 
this sense can be described as “asking good questions for good reasons,” or 
to paraphrase Kant, putting what one has learned and one’s own inclinations 
to think a certain way before the “tribunal of reason,” or, to put it another 
way, taking oneself seriously as a thinker, respecting and following up on 
one’s doubts and hesitancies. 
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Now if you think about the idea that I just sketched, it’s obviously not a 
very rational model for the efficient manufacture of products, patents and 
workers with specialized skills. To the contrary, it would seem to stand in 
the way of such efficiency. In that respect, I find it difficult to see how 
philosophy in the deepest sense can thrive in the formal institutions of our 
current culture. Having said that, is it really a catastrophe for culture and 
science that philosophy as an institutionalized academic discipline with its 
own departments and journals and prizes and book series has been relegated 
to just one minor part of the global (i.e. monocultural) educational-industrial 
complex? When you speak of renewal, I can see only two possibilities. One 
would be revolution, but that sort of major cultural upheaval can’t be pre- 
dicted or even really envisioned in any sensible way. The other is secession, 
and that is a possibility. In other words, if the authoritarian capitalism em- 
bodied by the implementation of NPM in education becomes so monolithic 
that “resistance is futile,” then there’s always the alternative of opting out, of 
finding or creating other venues for philosophical reflection, discourse and 
interchange. And who knows? Perhaps such an innovation could become a 
historical success story in the same ways as the Humboldtian University (RIP). 
 
MP: Interesting. There is much in your response that could take us in any 
number of directions but I am going to duck any comment and ask you to 
provide some autobiographical response in terms of your own philosophical 
education and also which philosophers you find most appealing to your own 
sensibilities. Is philosophy a form of autobiography? I suspect that an answer 
to these questions might also gel with your previous responses. 
 
SR: There’s a wonderful passage from Collingwood’s Essay on Philosoph- 
ical Method in which he makes just this point about philosophy and what 
you’re calling autobiography. He describes philosophical work as “a poem of 
the intellect,” where what is expressed in writing “is not emotions, desires, 
feelings, as such, but those which a thinking mind experiences in its search 
for knowledge; and it expresses these only because the experience of them 
is an integral part of the search, and that search is thought itself.” But he 
also sees philosophical prose as similar to historical writing in important 
respects having to do with how language is used, while at the same time he 
also sees a decisive difference. While historical writing is addressed primarily 
to a reader, “every piece of philosophical writing is primarily addressed by 
the author to himself.” His point is that the philosophical writer is trying to 
get clear on something. So while a good historian won’t bother the reader 
with whatever difficulties, confusions or uncertainties might have stood in 
the way of his work, the philosopher worth reading must necessarily confess 
his lack of understanding in order to show how he went about coming to 
grips with it. The best philosophers, in Collingwood’s view, are the ones 
who are prepared to admit that they are in the same state of darkness and 
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confusion as the reader. He says that whereas we “consult” a historian’s work, 
we “follow” the reasoning of the philosopher: that is, we try to understand 
what they think and to formulate for ourselves how and why they came to 
think it. I sympathize deeply with this view of what serious philosophical 
writing looks, and it guides how I read and teach philosophical texts. 
  So to answer your question, I can begin by saying that I rather like 
Collingwood, who has taught me a great deal about how to think about the 
history of philosophy and the philosophy of history, even if I find him prob- 
lematic when he’s in his most Idealistic modes. But I can’t say that he has a 
stronger influence on my philosophical development than a number of other 
philosophers. I take different things from different thinkers, depending upon 
what problems I happen to be grappling with. I disliked Kant as a young 
woman, but realized in my mid-twenties that he was probably the philosopher 
whom I held in highest esteem, whatever misgivings I had about his rational- 
ism. He’s done more good than damage to philosophy and science, which is 
not something that one can say about all philosophers. And the critical tra- 
dition and form of reflection that he initiated, from Hegel and Marx through 
Nietzsche and Weber and ultimately to Foucault, is probably where I find 
myself most at home. I have been influenced by Wittgenstein (who perhaps 
belongs to a somewhat different strand in Kantian thinking) and a certain 
form of Wittgensteinianism, but I wouldn’t say that my writing or teaching 
belongs to that tradition. My undergraduate and graduate studies were actually 
focused mostly on Plato and Aristotle, which is as good a ground as any, to 
say the least, for learning how to think philosophically. 
  But I should say that part of my intellectual biography is related to my 
never feeling that I belonged anywhere. Philosophy is, for me, as I said, work 
on oneself, even if that work is necessarily a kind of discussion with others. 
I would never deny the absolute necessity of a social context in which ques- 
tions arise, wherein they have meaning. In order for there to be thinking, there 
must be something to think about, and that requires more than one thinker.  
But if one believes that philosophy is possible, which I do, then one acknowl- 
edges that it can’t be reduced to collective standpoints and intellectual posi- 
tions. Another way to put the point is to say that the grammatical distinction 
between the first and the third person captures a basic truth about human 
experience. When you’re thinking about thinking, your personal foibles and 
idiosyncrasies sort of dissolve for an instant. You become for the moment 
Fichte’s “pure I,” so to speak. As I understand it, the achievement of this 
state was one of the singularly most important goals of the ancient philo- 
sophical schools. One of the reasons that I have become so engaged in ques- 
tions concerning pedagogy and the state of education is that I see a value in 
teaching students how to think in such a way so as not to be enslaved and 
demeaned by popular opinion, political cant, prejudice dressed up as ideas, 
their own private interests and personal weaknesses, the rhetoric of the power- 
 149 
ful and the lure of pleasure and convenience. I believe that education can, in 
principle, play this liberating role. It certainly did for me. I do not mean by 
this that philosophy will make you happy. But it can help you see clearly and 
get things straight, which has its own satisfactions, or, as Aristotle might say, 
is something worth having in and for itself. 
  And this brings me to my last point: the role played by my teachers. My 
becoming an academic philosopher is largely the consequence of a series of 
chance “meetings with remarkable men.” I have had the exceptionally good 
fortune to stumble, due to no forethought or intelligence on my part, into the 
hands of real thinkers. My first teacher in philosophy, Ken Dove, aside from 
being a gifted philosopher and original scholar, or perhaps because he was 
these things, had a keen eye for his students’ strengths and weakness, not 
merely with regard to how clever they were but in terms of their character. 
So, for example, I had an artistic, rebellious, bohemian side that I rather 
coddled because it made me feel, well, “interesting.” I wanted to write my 
honors thesis on Nietzsche, but Dove, quite rightly, saw this choice as symp- 
tomatic of certain tendencies in my thinking that rather needed to be reigned 
in and disciplined. I ended up writing my thesis on Aristotle’s Physics and 
Metaphysics. 
  In graduate school, I studied for Alphonso Lingis, whose style of philo- 
sophizing can only be described as living art, David Lachterman, who raised 
scholarship and commentary to the level of genius, and most especially Stanley 
Rosen, who was my advisor and mentor. I can’t imagine a more inspiring, 
challenging (and discombobulating) concatenation of thinkers to try to follow. 
Rosen in particular was essential to the forming of my character as a think- 
ing human being. He was quick-witted, had no time for pretense and nonsense, 
but at the same time he was a deep, passionate and yet careful thinker. He 
was also one of the funniest men I ever met. He had a fantastic ability to 
impart fundamental insights in a way that could knock you off your chair (he 
often remarked that a certain kind of laughter is characteristic of philos- 
ophers). And he also stressed the importance of character, of the character 
of thinking (although he never thematized it as such, as I recall). It was 
through him that I got to know Jacques Taminiaux, who was my advisor 
when I was at Louvain. This is another very serious scholar who, for all his 
European charm and cultivation, talked straight, said what he meant and meant 
what he said, and clearly had a mission in his philosophizing. Finally, when 
I arrived in Sweden I met someone who fundamentally altered my way of 
seeing things. Sören Stenlund, my dissertation supervisor, began his career 
as a logician and a philosopher of mathematics, and was highly regarded both 
nationally and internationally for his contributions. But after a number of 
years, his philosophical frustration led him to look back into the history of 
the development of logic and mathematics and philosophical thinking about 
them: first to Frege, then to Kant, then to Descartes….In the end, his think- 
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ing came to be deeply influenced by Wittgenstein, at a time when Swedish 
philosophy was somewhat narrowly confined to Anglophone analytic philos- 
ophy. Stenlund’s seminars were a kind of subversive activity in the academic 
climate of the day, and they attracted a wide range of dissidents, refugees 
and exiles from different fields and departments: not only philosophy, but also 
mathematics, the history of ideas, linguistics, comparative literature, etc. 
There was no explicit aim to achieve “interdisciplinarity” for its own sake, 
or “to create a forum for transdisciplinary dialogue.” We were just a group 
of people trying to help each other come to grips with our problems (as 
thinkers).  Stenlund’s seminar was a kind of asylum in both senses: a shelter 
from persecution for our ideas (from our perspective) and a loony bin from 
the viewpoint of more mainstream academics. We had to put up with derisive 
remarks about the “cult of der Heilige Ludwig” and so forth, but it really 
didn’t matter to us. Stenlund taught us not only, or even primarily, through 
his teaching, but really through his example, how to be honest with, and 
responsible to, ourselves as thinkers, very much in the spirit of Kant. I really 
cannot begin to assess what those years under his tutelage meant to me as a 
human being (and necessarily therefore also as a student and teacher of phi- 
losophy). I mean that quite literally. A number of years ago, I had an idea 
for a paper about the history of philosophy and I recalled that I had read a 
very insightful article by a Swedish turn-of-the-century philosopher named 
Hans Larsson. I found some notes that I had taken years earlier on the 
Larsson piece, and wondered what in the world had led me to read it in the 
first place. The notes were an interpretation of the text that expressed just 
exactly what I wanted to say, but I couldn’t recall what stimulated me to 
write them. Given the tone and “feel” of the notes, I figured that I must have 
been inspired by something that Stenlund had said or written, so I asked him 
if he could give me the reference to where I had found it. But Stenlund said 
that he had never read Larsson, or if he had, very little and a long time ago, 
and he certainly hadn’t written anything about him. This seemingly trivial 
occurrence struck me as quite telling. What it tells me is that in certain 
respects, I cannot distinguish my own thoughts as “mine.” Recalling now 
what I said with reference to Collingwood, it makes perfect sense that, in 
some sense, I can’t actually separate my own way of thinking from my earlier 
attempts to figure out what Kant or Weber or Stenlund or Rosen meant. There 
is no conflict between thinking for yourself and thinking through others; the 
former presupposes the latter. It all becomes part of you. And that’s the point 
of Bildung. Philosophy isn’t first and foremost some kind of knowledge that 
you “possess.” It’s not something you have or even do, it’s rather a way of 
characterizing a certain form of life of the mind.  
MP: You provide a complicated genealogy and network of influences but at 
the same time unequivocally locate yourself. Can I focus on one aspect of 
these linkages and settle on the question of nihilism. I know that Rosen has 
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devoted himself to this question (as many philosophers in the critical tradition 
have). Heidegger’s focus on “The History of European Nihilism” in his Nietz- 
sche study seemed to me at the time the most perspicacious set of observa- 
tions I had read. Certainly, many of the philosophers you mention, both dead 
and alive, have defined themselves in regard to this question. Where do you 
situated yourself? On what axis? I would also like to hear something more 
about Stenlund and why/how work in the philosophy of logic and mathematics 
became important for you. 
 
SR: I think that I can best answer the first question by beginning with the 
second. The philosophy of logic and the philosophy of mathematics, as areas 
of academic specialization, are not of any particular interest to me. But they 
were of interest to Kant and Husserl, Wittgenstein and, most importantly for 
me, to Stenlund. Stenlund’s Wittgensteinianism is very particular to him, just 
as Rosen’s Platonism is in many ways very much an expression of Rosen’s 
philosophy. Stenlund taught us how to see which problems really are prob- 
lems, and to distinguish them from problems arising in and through a certain 
technical apparatus or theoretical framework. In this sense, the philosophy 
of language as he taught it was much more than a branch of philosophy; it’s 
rather a way of thinking. To take an example of a problem in the philosophy 
of science and philosophy of mathematics that is equally a problem in the 
philosophy of language, consider the idea that certain statements are unintel- 
ligible given the science of a certain epoch, but can become intelligible as 
science develops. So for instance, we could not understand the statement 
“there is a triangle whose angle sum is greater than 180°,” but now, due to 
the advent of non-Euclidean geometry, the statement is meaningful. It is 
tempting to think that the same must also hold true, by analogy with the 
geometrical statement regarding the angle sum of the triangle, for a statement 
such as 2+2=4, i.e. that in the future it is possible that there would be 
exceptions to the truth of the statement 2+2=4. If this were the case, then 
even truths that we call “conceptual” are subject to historical revision, which 
would seem to open the floodgates of relativism. But we find in Wittgen- 
stein’s philosophy of mathematics a distinction between uses of the rules of 
calculation (say, 2+2=4) and statements made in ordinary language (such as 
“there is a triangle the sum angle of which is greater than 180°”). While we 
certainly can and do use calculations meaningfully and usefully both in sci- 
entific research and everyday life and talk about them in ordinary language, 
the calculations themselves are not “statements” or “propositions.” Whereas 
to say “there is a triangle who angle sum is greater than 180°” in everyday 
language is to say something about geometry, to say that 2+2=4 is just to 
add. Obviously, I can’t go into the details here, but what I want to draw 
attention to with this example, is that it is not primarily of interest for mathe- 
maticians, but rather to philosophers, people who worry about things like the 
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corrigibility of conceptual claims. And this kind of problem shares a family 
resemblance with a host of problems that one normally would not associate 
with logic or science (historicism, social constructivism, linguistic relativity, 
etc.). And the solution, for Stenlund, is not to theorize more, to embrace one 
position or another (foundationalism or anti-foundationalism, realism or anti-
realism, etc.) but to go back to the initial problem that provoked one to start 
theorizing to begin with. To take another example, he remarked on occasion 
that the philosophically interesting thing about an infinite regress is not how 
to get out of it, but how you get into it in the first place. Stenlund, following 
Wittgenstein, using very basic examples and crisp, austere prose, can bring 
a philosophical claim that looks like an insoluble theoretical enigma back 
home, back to where it actually does its work, when it’s not, as Wittgenstein 
says, “on holiday”.   
      And this brings me back to what I said about the “character” of philos- 
ophy earlier. Stenlund comes from the sparsely populated northern reaches of 
Sweden, far from anything resembling academic or cultural centers. At the 
time he grew up, very few people in his surroundings continued their edu- 
cation on to high school, much less to graduate school. He was never fully 
“at home” in academic life. He’s a philosopher not out of ambition, social- 
ization or vanity, but by character. I think he was always more contented 
when he was out fly-fishing, moose-hunting and planting potatoes, but he 
also needed people to talk to about what was on his mind, and what was on 
his mind happened to be problems that we academics categorize in special- 
izations called “logic,” “philosophy of language,” “philosophy of mathematics,” 
etc. 
      Now let’s look at the problem of nihilism in light of what I just said. Back 
in the days when I studied for Rosen, the problem of nihilism was something 
that was talked about a great deal by the graduate students. We read books 
on the theme, and, as a matter of fact, I once again was set on writing a 
dissertation on Nietzsche (which was never realized either). But one of the 
things that happened to me when I met Stenlund, was that I started asking 
different questions. It’s not that the question of nihilism ceased to be a 
problem for me, but it became a different kind of problem. We can certainly 
gain a better understanding of our present condition by reading Nietzsche, 
Heidegger and Kierkegaard. But there is a tendency to intellectualize the 
problems by starting with their philosophical, artistic or literary expressions 
and terms, rather than with our problems. So, for example, it seems to me that 
Wendell Berry has a good point when he emphasizes the intimate relationship 
between work (economics) and values (religion), where the latter is not seen 
as “mere ideology” superimposed on real material conditions, but where 
values and beliefs are truly part and parcel of a way of living in and being 
engaged in the world. And in this sense, it’s no accident that Christianity 
started losing ground at the same time as farmers quite literally started losing 
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ground. Industrialization de facto deprived people of meaningful livelihoods 
and relations to their homes and neighbors. It uprooted entire regions, and 
left the former inhabitants rootless wanderers whose work and whose environ- 
ment were utterly alien to them. So the religious way of life disappeared 
when the most self-evident values of care for the land, fidelity toward one’s 
family, responsibility toward one’s neighbor, etc. disappeared. Of course, 
there are neighborhoods in large cities (I grew up in one in New York), but 
the sheer multiplicity of life forms in such places makes it impossible to 
regard everyone on your block as “your neighbor” as you would if you were 
dependent upon each other for your livelihoods. I think that this is one way 
to understand why immigrant youths in London and Stockholm are suscep- 
tible to radicalization and rioting. In the global information society, they have 
nothing: no sense of home, no sense of what to hope for. Whether or not 
one understands the rioting as political, one ought to take seriously the in- 
tensity of the ennui which gives rise to them. If you set fire to your uncle’s 
car and tear down your little sister’s preschool merely because you have 
nothing to do, then it’s because it doesn’t seem to matter much what you do.  
So whether or not one chooses to see it in terms of ideology, it is political 
insofar as it arises in and out of a polis that is not working, that is, in which 
people reside without belonging. And religious radicalization, like other 
populist and fascist movements we are seeing gain steam, is to my mind a 
grasping at what looks like a promise of meaning and belonging. The modern 
project is, among other things, one of trying to create institutions (such as 
the nation-state) that will serve as a substitute for the lost intimacy with and 
reliance on one’s neighbors and local surroundings. I’m helplessly modern 
and rationalist in my inclinations, by which I mean I tend to look to govern- 
ment regulation and public ownership as the only viable solution to today’s 
societal ails, but I do recognize that the loss of the “natural autonomy” of 
the self-subsisting community is the price we pay for the formal autonomy 
bestowed upon us by citizenship in post-industrial liberal democracies.  
      And, in that sense, anomie or nihilism or disenchantment or leveling or 
whatever you choose to call it is not just a question of the quietus of God as 
ground and guarantor of morality; it’s a matter of absolute concrete loss. It 
seems to me that whatever inspiration and insight we derive from reading 
Weber or Nietzsche, which, in my case, is inestimable, we have the right and 
the duty to start afresh from where we stand today and not satisfy ourselves 
with meditations on what others have said before us. As Nietzsche says, one 
repays one’s teachers badly by remaining a pupil. I suppose one could say 
that in this respect, I’m sympathetic to the idea of analytic philosophy (or 
pragmatism, for that matter) as it was originally formulated: to start with prob- 
lems, not with texts. Unfortunately, Anglophone academic philosophy today 
has by and large developed into just the sort of dogmatic scholasticism that 
it was originally intended to supplant, with the difference that its questions 
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tend to be more technical and less relevant for issues of profound human 
concern, such as nihilism. 
 
MP: Ok, I’m learning a lot and I like what I hear. I’m aware of length so I 
am going to ask a final set of questions. Can you describe the projects you 
are currently working on and what you think are the most important questions 
determining the future of philosophy. 
 
SR: I’ll start with the second theme. I think that it’s up to each of us to 
consider what we take to be the most pressing issues. So I can’t say what 
the most important questions determining the future of philosophy are, but I 
can say what sorts of things have occupied my own thoughts. For one thing, 
I actually think that philosophical questions concerning the individual’s relation 
to the collective, between subjectivity and objectivity, between the first – and 
third-person perspective, etc. can and should be articulated and worked out 
in terms of our present condition. I remember how deeply effected, disturbed 
really, I was by a passage in Sebastian Haffner’s diary, where he describes 
how comfortable it was to be relieved of the duty to think, to take respon- 
sibility for one’s thinking. He tells how the Nazi indoctrination camps for 
the Reich’s younger public servants effectively deprived them of the capacity 
to notice what was happening to their very self-conception. Roughly trans- 
lated, the passage said something like:  
“And I? I notice that I haven’t had any occasion recently to use the word 
“I” in my story. I have alternated between third- and first-person plural: the 
first-person singular has had no occasion to confess itself. This is no coin- 
cidence. It was a point – perhaps the main point – in what happened to us in 
the camp, that each and every individual played no roll; he was disconnected 
and out of play; he didn’t count. […] What one was and thought “privately” 
and “actually” was indifferent and put aside. […] Companionship takes from 
the human being responsibility for himself, before God and before his con- 
science. He does what everybody does. He has no choice. He has no time to 
reflect […] It is said that the Germans have been enslaved. That’s only partially 
correct. They are at the same time something else – something much worse 
– for which there is still no word. They have been “companionated.”  
It seems to me that we too, despite all the rhetoric of self-realization and 
individualism, have been “companionated.” We can choose between hundreds 
of cable stations and 14 kinds of bagels, and even as professional philos- 
ophers, for example, we can select among a plethora of theories, positions 
and isms to justify, espouse, develop or promote. But there is little room in 
public discourse for deeper deliberation and judgment regarding what is worth 
choosing, or how we should go about deliberating. It should be obvious that 
I think that this is a very unfortunate state of affairs, if true. So how does 
that fit together with my paean to the local community in my answer to the 
previous question? After all, as I said, the modern project has been one of 
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liberating the individual, through education and the rule of law, from the 
claustrophobic superstition, prejudice, and stagnation that characterizes tra- 
ditional, tightly knit communities. Here I see a parallel between two kinds of 
community, traditional and democratic, and two senses of collegiality. In the 
sense for which it’s often attacked, the latter is essentially institutionalized 
cognitive cronyism. And there are plenty of professors who seem to think that 
laws protecting academic freedom and autonomy guarantee their right to do 
anything they please, or, alternatively do nothing at all. But there’s another 
sense of collegiality that is something entirely different. It is the notion that 
the teachers and students that comprise the university constitute a community 
in which each and every member has rights and obligations to the other mem- 
bers insofar as they all serve the goals of science, scholarship and humanity 
by increasing its common store of knowledge. Now the latter form requires 
individual thinking and judgment openly put before the scrutiny of the mem- 
bers of the community. The former, on the other hand, is “private” in the 
sense that it’s based on personal interests and collective agendas not belong- 
ing to the meaningful flourishing of science as such, but to the “group,” one’s 
“companions.”   
There’s a fair bit of confusion regarding what subjectivity is, but a com- 
mon prejudice is to associate it and related terms, such as judgment, with 
the personal, the private, the psychological, the contingent. We have lost the 
idea of the subjective as the name for the activity that occurs every time a 
thought is thought, an action is intended, an idea is comprehended. But as 
soon as one makes this point, the tendency today is to counter with descrip- 
tions of how the subject is constituted by common concepts and a shared 
language, social structures, inherited representations and entrenched institu- 
tions, such that all our thinking is always already first and foremost a product. 
I don’t want to deny the value of examining our way of life from this per- 
spective, but I do think that there’s an exaggerated, even metaphysical, faith 
in what is essentially a generalization from certain idea-typical investigations 
that blinds us to the complexity of what it means to think, to know, or to 
value. I rather like how the American sociologist William Whyte formulated 
the problem. He wrote: “One can study something without deifying it, and 
the recognition that a society can be all-embracing doesn’t require the belief 
that it should be.” Even if historical, ethnological, and sociological studies 
show the actual, practical primacy of collectives, it can never show that this 
ought to be the case, or that this state of affairs is beyond all reflection or 
revision. And to reflect upon the conditions for the possibility of certainty, 
universality, justice and so forth is what philosophy is supposed to do. But I 
fear that that idea of philosophy as always starting afresh, or “radically 
beginning”, as Husserl would say, isn’t taken very seriously anymore. One 
reason for this, to my mind, is that professional philosophers have been “com- 
panionated”; our self-conception is a far cry from a Fichtean community of 
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scholars in the service of humanity whose personal self-interest is fulfilled in 
the immortality of scientific and social progress. So I suppose that my answer 
to the question of what issues will determine the future of philosophy, would 
be self-scrutiny. We need to sincerely and resolutely take a close, hard look 
at what we’re doing (the papers we write, the conferences we attend, the 
courses we teach, the articles and books we read, the research projects we 
initiate, the evaluation exercises to which we submit), and ask ourselves: to 
what end? And by this I don’t mean the usual vague, sweeping formulations 
about the value of liberal education for democracy, or justifications by way of 
a self-serving disciplinary historiography which highlights the contributions 
of philosophy or philosophers to the progress of science, or cheap shots at 
other humanist disciplines with reference to our comparative success in adapt- 
ing to scientometric standards, etc., but rather an unflinching, critical self-
examination about the possibility and purpose of philosophy. 
My own current work is related to all the things we’ve just discussed. I 
have three projects, or rather ideas that I’m working on right now. One con- 
cerns the scientific publication market, together with scholars from the history 
of science and ideas, business history, sociology of literature, and sociology 
of philosophy. My part in the project, “The Practice of Theory,” studies the 
relationship between explicit standards of argumentation and scholarship and 
de facto practice in the discipline, and analyzes the functional establishment 
of an institutionalized philosophical “center” and “periphery” through JIF 
and other similar techniques of mechanized, quantitative evaluation. The 
philosophical interest of the project is to ask what it is that philosophy (the 
community of professional philosophers) takes to be its central task and the 
criteria according to which it assesses the extent to which this is achieved, 
and the rationality behind these criteria. The idea is to navigate between the 
third-person perspective on the discipline in the manner of sociology of 
knowledge, and the first-person (plural) perspective on the subject’s internal 
historiography, to see what the disciplinary values that inform judgment are 
de facto, and compare these to the values explicitly avowed by its practi- 
tioners. One could describe the task here as a micro-study of a theme that I 
have been concerned with since I wrote my dissertation, namely, the dis- 
mantling of the notion of judgment as grounded in a subject and its’ re- 
placement with an anonymous, mechanized objectivity.  
A related project has the working title “Philosophy and the Very Idea of 
a University.” My thesis is that ideas about how to improve and maintain 
efficiency and quality in education are necessarily reflections of values regard- 
ing what one takes to be its central point and purpose, and these ideas are in 
turn expressions of historically determinate social and cultural norms, prac- 
tices and tendencies, some of which have the character of “absolute pre-
suppositions,” to borrow a term from Collingwood. What philosophy can 
contribute to the debate on education and research, among other things, is to 
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raise our awareness about the assumptions involved in current ideas, and help 
us see not necessarily what alternatives are available, but at very least that 
alternatives are possible. To this end, I would want to concentrate on a cer- 
tain eventalization which occurred with the advent of the modern research 
university and the conceptualization of science and education that came with 
it. One of the keys to understanding this specific event, I think, is the shift in 
the sense of “objectivity” described by Daston and Gallison. They trace the 
modern terminology of “subjective” and “objective” to the early 19th century 
reception of Kantian philosophy, leading to the general use of the modern 
sense of objectivity by the 1850´s. With this new assumption, the value of 
the cultivation of the capacity for and exercise of judgment as a sine qua non 
for science becomes almost incomprehensible. Judgment is thought to belong 
to the domain of the aesthetic and perhaps the ethical, but has no place in 
scientific thinking per se. At the same time, I want to show that judgment is 
inescapable insofar as long as there is evaluation. Judgment is something 
necessarily exercised by the subject, however one conceptualizes the grounds 
on which the judgment is exercised. Mechanized quantification does not do 
away with judgment; it merely weakens, impairs and hides it. In this re- 
spect, formalized systems of verification and assessment are undemocratic, 
since the norms on which they are based are not transparent. You cannot 
reason or debate with a thing, and what formalized procedures and protocols 
do is to reify the norms involved in the activity of assessment and evaluations 
so that considerations alien to the system are locked out at the outset, thus 
crippling judgment and disenabling reasoned discourse. The project is a 
study of the philosophical analysis of the idea of subjective judgment and its 
relation in particular to education and scientific thinking, which I take to be 
intimately related to the question of “critical thinking,” how it is to be cul- 
tivated and to what purpose. 
Finally, I’ve submitted a proposal for funding for a research project with 
colleagues in philosophy and literature called “What should a Swede know?” 
The idea is to examine the concept(s) of education implicitly assumed in the 
Swedish educational system: which ideals are explicitly formulated and on 
what tacit presuppositions, which educational aims are articulated as the ulti- 
mate function of education at different levels and how are these to be real- 
ized? In higher education, the notion of Bildung is central, but related to other 
forms of training and education: the project analyzes the transformation of 
the academic notion of education within the educational system as a whole 
and how the idea is negotiated to fulfill the purposes and goals of the dis- 
tinctly Swedish phenomenon of a generously state- and community-sponsored 
program of lifetime education. 
 
MP: Thank you. 
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